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ABSTRACT 
 
Since 2015, the Government has allocated village development funds in the 
form of Village Fund policies of IDR 20.7 trillion, then in 2016 it increased to IDR 
46.9 trillion, and continues to increase in the following years. However, based on field 
research in a number of regions in Indonesia, it turns out that the use of Village Funds 
is not optimal, some of which have been proven wrongly targeted, not transparent in 
use, and not accountable in reporting. The aspect of planning activities and the quality 
of human resources implementing policies and coordination between parties that 
should play a role are still a major problem. 
 
The PPP (Public-Private Partnership) model is actually intended for the 
development of large-scale projects, such as the construction of highways or seaports 
and airports. But by taking the substance of cooperation from the parties that each 
have strengths, the PPP model (and its variants) may be applicable in the use of 
Village Funds. Using secondary data analysts, the following article discusses the 
theoretical aspects of the advantages of the PPP model. This model is juxtaposed with 
cases of success in building the economic self-reliance of rural communities with the 
help of private parties and academics. It is assumed that the partnership model can be 
an alternative solution to further optimize the use of Village Funds in order to reduce 
poverty in rural areas. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In Indonesia, the village is the center of the problem of the welfare of the 
nation's life. This is not only related to demographic facts, where 51 percent of the 
population of this country lives in villages with all their dynamics (BPS, 2010), but 
also poverty problems related to income inequality and low economic productivity of 
the people, when compared to the level of income and productivity of the community 
urban. Quoting Kompas.com (3/29/2017), the percentage of rural poverty was 
recorded at 13.96 percent or almost double the percentage of the poor in the city by 
7.7 percent. Other data showed that the centers of poverty and gap in Indonesia are in 
rural villages and regions in Eastern Indonesia. As many as 60.91 percent of the poor 
live in the village. The majority of them work in the agricultural sector, which is 49.9 
percent (Kompas, 07/31/2018). 
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The final report of the 2015 Center for Socio-Economic and Agricultural Policy of the 
Agricultural Research and Development Agency shows changes in consumption 
patterns in the village. The results of the study said, the consumption of carbohydrate 
sources of food increasingly leads to finished food. The contribution of local food to 
the consumption of the village community is decreasing because the attractiveness of 
the business in the village, especially agriculture, continues to reduce. The profession 
as a farmer is increasingly being abandoned because his income is no longer 
attractive. More than 70 percent of farmers aged 40 years and over, even those over 
50 years old are more than 40 percent, meaning that they are less productive. On the 
other hand, the conversion of agricultural land and plantations continues to occur. In 
the last 10 years, there have been several villages, especially in the suburbs, which 
experienced conversion of paddy fields over 100 hectares. The conversion generally 
occurs due to infrastructure development, residential areas, industries, and 
transportation infrastructure. Therefore, it is assumed that there needs to be special 
attention by the Government to address the problem of rural development, especially 
in the vulnerable groups. 
 
The government, since 2015, has a commitment to pay special attention in the 
form of Village Fund policies to finance infrastructure development and village 
community empowerment activities. The political considerations of granting village 
funds are based on Law No. 6 of 2014 concerning Villages, and Government 
Regulation number 60 of 2014 concerning Village Funds. The number of villages in 
Indonesia is 74,958. Village funds that are intended to finance village development 
are determined to be sourced from the State Budget. By the Ministry of Finance, the 
Village Fund allocation in 2015 was set at IDR 20.76 trillion. This means that each 
village receives a fund allocation of around IDR 628 million per year. In 2016 the 
allocation of Village Funds in the Draft State Budget increased to IDR 46.98 trillion, 
then to IDR 60 in the 2017 fiscal year, with an allocation of around IDR 1 billion per 
village. The realization of the Village Fund budget in the 2015-2017 period was 
recorded at IDR 127 trillion, a not a little amount of funds to build villages. 
 
The question is whether the Village Fund policy that comes from the APBN has 
been utilized properly? The next question is, does the Village Fund's policy have a 
positive impact in the form of reducing rural poverty? The following explanation is an 
example of cases to show the fact in the field that the use of the Village Fund is 
actually full of problems, besides indeed in some areas the Village Fund has proven to 
provide extraordinary benefits to the village community. 
 
1.1. The obstacle on administrative procedures 
 
The rules for the implementation of Village Fund usage in the first years are 
arguably not well understood by the implementing apparatus, especially the Village 
Head as the person in charge of the implementation, although over time the 
implementation rules have been continuously refined. In the first year of 
implementation, the use of village fund could not be well understood by the village 
apparatus, especially by the village apparatus who acted as the executor and the 
person in charge of the project (see for example Sarman, 2017; and Yoseph, 2018). 
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The Ministry of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Areas, and 
Transmigration (hereinafter referred to as the Village Ministery) stipulates Ministerial 
Regulation number 5 of 2015 concerning the priority of using Village Funds. The 
regulation states that Village Funds are used to improve the welfare of rural 
communities and alleviate poverty through fulfilling basic needs, developing village 
facilities and infrastructure, developing local economic potential, and utilizing 
resources and the environment. 
 
The evaluation results of the Ministry of Village, the 2015 Village Fund 
disbursement for East Lombok District for example, has been disbursed in excess of 
IDR 164 billion, which is the total Village Fund in all districts. (Cendana News, 
12/16/2015). Reportedly 92% of the funds are used to build infrastructure that builds 
the fishing industry. The use of these funds is in accordance with article 7 section C of 
Ministerial Regulation number 5 of 2015 which states that Village Funds can be used 
to support maritime and marine development as a form of village infrastructure and 
infrastructure development and the development of local economic potential. This use 
is also considered appropriate by looking at the conditions in East Lombok where the 
amount of fishing production continues to rise from 2009, although it had dropped in 
2011 before rising until 2013 according to data from the Marine and Fisheries 
Service. Whereas in Sleman, Village Funds are used to build infrastructure such as 
irrigation facilities, dams, and inter-village roads as well as community empowerment 
through fish farming. Flexibility Village Fund Management makes the Village Fund 
that should be used for infrastructure can be used for other village programs such as 
livestock and so on. 
 
Although at the macro level the use of the Village Fund is effective enough, but many 
aspects still need to pay attention by the Government as Village Fund providers. For 
distribution of the IDR 20 trillion in Village Funds issued by the Government in 2015, 
funds that entered the new village were IDR 16.5 trillion. In October, of the 16.5 
trillion only IDR 7.1 trillion was distributed to villages from the Regency. This could 
occur due to village delays in preparing the Village Revenue and Expenditure Budget 
(APBDes). For example in Pekalongan, in October 2015 there were 19 villages that 
had not yet compiled their APBDes (Sofianto, 2017). In addition, there are some 
regions that despite the awareness of the village government to carry out and prepare 
accountability reports well but have not received village funds until December as in 
the Kulon Progo area. 
 
From various reports, the allocation of Village Funds in 2016 had problems in 
the aspect of the time to received it. Many villages have just received Village Funds a 
few months before December. In Temanggung for example, some new villages 
received Village Funds at the end of October, whereas the time to use village funds 
was only until December. This makes development activities ineffective. 
Infrastructure development cannot be completed on time. Villages that have not yet 
received funds have made development using loans or debt from third parties. Starting 
village development with funds from debt is risky. At the next stage, the villages 
concerned are constrained to fulfill their obligations to submit a report on the use of 
funds in 2016, and as a result the 2017 funds cannot be disbursed until March 2017 
(Metronew.com, 03/12/2017). Whereas for 2017, in Temanggung Regency funds 
amounting to IDR 207 billion were provided. The funds will be distributed to 266 
villages. Thus, each village in Temanggung Regency should receive funds of IDR 800 
million - IDR 1.5 billion. Because of similar problems, the second and third stage of 
2018 Village Fund disbursement for 26 districts in Papua Province is threatened to be 
stopped (Kompas, 05/19/2018). 
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At macro level, regulation can be considered a problem in Village Fund 
allocations in 2015 and 2016. Lack of village apparatus knowledge about applicable 
regulations makes allocation of funds not run smoothly. Every time receive funds, the 
village apparatus must make a letter of accountability first, even though many village 
officials do not understand about this process. As a result there is fear of the village 
apparatus to use Village Funds (Atmaja and Saputra, 2017). 
 
The news presented by Kompas Dayly (06/29/2018) reinforces the notion that 
the problem of administrative procedures for disbursing funds is still the main 
problem. It was stated that 45,816 villages had not received the Village Fund the 
second stage because the village was late in fulfilling administrative requirements, 
including preparing the APBDes. As a result, as much as IDR 14.7 trillion in Village 
Funds still deposited in the accounts of 264 Local Governments, even though the 
funds should have been channeled to villages. The cause of this problem is mainly 
due to the village government - with a capacity that is generally still limited - slow to 
meet administrative requirements. Recognizing the limited capacity of village 
officials, Yoseph (2018) suggested that project administration and budgets for Village 
Funds should be simplified and made easy. It is not the other way around, as is done 
by some regions which actually adds the requirements to disburse Village Funds. For 
example in Central Java, there are local governments that require the physical design 
of buildings by villages before the Village Fund is disbursed. Even though this 
requirement is clearly not easy and not all village officials have such capacity. 
 
Potential misuse of Village Funds can be seen from the perspective of large 
budget management, but its implementation at the village level is not accompanied by 
the principles of transparency, participation, and accountability in political 
governance, development, and village finance. According to the results of a review of 
Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), in 2015 - 2017 cases of corruption in the village 
increased. In 2015, corruption cases reached 17 cases and increased to 41 cases in 
2016. The surge more than doubled then occurred in 2017 with 96 cases. A total of 
154 cases of corruption were found. Not all of the 154 corruption cases in the village 
sector above are village budget corruption. The number of cases with village budget 
objects reached 127 cases, of which there were 27 cases with village non-budget 
objects or a total of 18% of the total cases. Cases with non-budget village objects such 
as illegal charges by village officials. While the object of corruption in the village 
budget includes corruption of Village Fund Allocation (ADD), Village Fund, Village 
Cash, and others. 
 
ICW (2018) further explained that from the aspect of state losses, corruption in the 
village contributed to large losses. In 2015 the loss reached IDR 9.12 billion. In 2016, 
losses reached IDR 8.33 billion. Meanwhile in 2017, losses jumped to IDR 30.11 
billion. The total state losses caused by corruption in the village sector reached IDR 
47.56 billion, equivalent to the basic allocation of APBN funds for 77 villages. 
Various modes were carried out by corruption actors in the village, including budget 
misuse practices as many as 51 cases, embezzlement of 32 cases, fictitious reports 
with 17 cases, fictitious activities / projects of 15 cases, and budget inflations of 14 
cases. One of the budget misuse modes involving Sukaresmi Village Chief, Cisaat 
District, Sukabumi Regency. He allegedly misappropriated the Village Fund and 
ADD for personal gain with a total amount of IDR 186,881,376. 
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Regarding the vulnerability of the Village Fund, it was abused, actually it was 
tracked earlier in the day by the KPK. In June 2015, the KPK revealed the potential 
for corruption in the Village Fund. The potential for corruption includes four aspects, 
namely regulatory and institutional aspects, governance aspects, supervision aspects, 
and aspects of human resources. From the regulatory and institutional aspects, 
incomplete implementation regulations and technical instructions constitute the 
potential for corruption in this Village Fund. From the governance aspect, the time 
frame of the village budget management cycle and the standard price unit for the 
benchmark for the village to prepare the APBDes that are not yet available is a 
potential for corruption. From the aspect of supervision, the effectiveness of the 
regional apparatus in conducting low supervision coupled with the lack of good 
public complaint channels is considered as potential corruption. From the aspect of 
human resources, there is an opportunity for facilitators to do corruption or fraud 
using the weaknesses of the village apparatus (KPK: Press Release, 06/12/2015). And 
it was proven, the KPK then determined five suspects in the Village Security Fund 
'bribe' case in Dassok Village, Pamekasan. Bribes were given IDR 250 million from 
the Village Head of Dassok to the Head of the District Prosecutor's Office (Kajari) 
Pamekasan. The bribe was given so that the Kajari Pamekasan did not follow up on 
the reporting of an NGO to the Pamekasan Prosecutor's Office in connection with the 
alleged procurement corruption in Dassok Village that used village funds worth IDR 
100 million (DetikNews, 02/08/2017). 
 
Regarding the procedure error in the use of the Village Fund it may not be 
solely in the case of the executing apparatus, because the administration procedures 
for Village Fund management really tend to be complicated. There are at least five 
government regulations under the law, plus 13 ministerial-level rules (ministerial 
regulations) as the legal umbrella for the implementation of village fund management. 
For villagers, village officials are no exception, it is not easy to understand how to 
implement Village Fund governance correctly. The results of field studies indicate 
that the implementing apparatus in the village government, program assistants, and 
even program supervisor in the district, are not really ready to use Dana Desa 
accountably in accordance with the principles of project management (Utama, 2017; 
Syakriah, 2017; Sekarsita, 2017; Sarman, 2017; Sarman and Purwanto, 2017; Sarman 
and Wahid, 2017; Mushalli, 2017; Yoseph, 2018). It was as if to justify the facts 
presented by various news in the mass media, that all parties seemed to see the 
Village Fund as merely a "project" and that each person wanted to be involved in the 
distribution of the "project". Whereas what is meant by the Village Fund "project" is 
actually a basic capital to realize an independent village community. That is, rural 
communities who are advanced and empowered. People who are able to explore the 
potential sources of themselves and their village environment in order to have a 
maximum impact on their welfare. 
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1.2. Success story of Using Village Funds and Poverty Reduction 
 
In addition to the grim news about the use of the Village Fund, a number of success 
stories in various regions can also be shown. At the very least, the Village Ministry 
claims that for three years since 2015 it has succeeded in improving the condition of 
15,000 underdeveloped villages from the original number of 20,000 villages 
(Kompas, 07/17/2018). Other Government data stated that the use of the Village Fund 
had been used, among others, for the construction of around 124 thousand kilometers 
of village roads, 791 kilometers of bridges, and access to clean water of 38.3 thousand 
units. In addition, around 3,000 boat mooring units, 18.2 thousand PAUD (Early 
Childhood Education Programs) units, 5,400 Polindes (village maternity huts) units, 
6,600 village market units, 28.8 thousand irrigation units, 11.6 thousand Posyandu 
(Maternal and Child Health Service) units, and around 2,000 reservoir units (CNN 
Indonesia (08/16/2018), quoted the President when delivering the 2019 RAPBN 
Financial Note Speech in front of the DPR RI Plenary Session). 
 
Although the numbers are still limited, what the Kompas Daily reported serially 
in the "Village Innovation" column shows that a number of regions have succeeded in 
using Village Funds, perhaps surpassing the imagination of the Village Fund policy 
makers themselves. For example the success story of the people of Langgongsari 
Village, Banyumas, Central Java. The Langgongsari Village apparatus utilizes the 
Village Fund to transform abandoned village land into agrotourism and village 
business centers. They also strengthen Village Owned Enterprises (BUMDes) with 
four other businesses. For that achievement, the Village Head received an award from 
the Financial Services Authority (Kompas, 01/31/2018). 
 
The success story was also experienced by the residents of Seketi Village, 
Balongbendo, Sidoarjo, East Java, who chose to maintain the bamboo woven 
(tampah) tradition, by evolving according to current market tastes. Using Village 
Funds, local village officials in 2016 agreed to establish BUMDes. BUMDes opens 
capital access for artisans by providing business loans of IDR 1 million - IDR 3 
million. Crafters are free from moneylenders when they have alternative funding 
sources. The loan from BUMDes is light interest, only 1 percent per year and without 
collateral. BUMDes also expand the marketing network of craftsmen through the 
village market, specifically bamboo woven products. Now there are 25 craftsmen who 
still exist. One craftsman, Khosim, is able to produce 150-200 tampah per month. 
Assuming a selling price of IDR 10,000 per tampah, the turnover reaches IDR 2 
million per month. From the turnover, artisans can reap a net income of IDR 1.5 
million because the production costs are low because they only calculate the cost of 
shopping for bamboo bars (Kompas, 01/24/2018). 
 
The use of Village Funds for productive economic purposes was also carried out 
by residents of Ciawigajah, Beber District, Cirebon Regency, West Java. These 
villagers use the Village Fund to process water from the spring into bottled water. 
Marketing is carried out by BUMDes. According to the Ciawigajah Village Head, if it 
goes according to plan, village income can be IDR 1.2 billion per year from the 
bottled water business. Even though, the Village Government also utilizes the Village 
Fund to develop the village into a center for sweet potatoes, with a production of 200 
tons - 300 tons of sweet potatoes per year (Kompas, 03/28/2018). 
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The socio-economic approach in utilizing Village Funds has also been carried 
out by three Village Heads, namely Jomboran, Jimbung, and Krakitan Village in 
Klaten District, Central Java. These three villages that are geographically close 
together collaborate so that the environmental potential they have is increasingly 
developing through various innovations and enhancing human resources. What the 
village heads did was to develop a "desapolitan" area based on BUMDes, with the 
help of thoughts from a Professor of Gadjah Mada University (Kompas, 11/4/2018). 
 
From the example case of the successful use of the Village Fund, it can be 
underlined that one of the main supporting factors is the BUMDes institution, in 
addition to the active participation of the community. The BUMDes need to be 
established in every village that wants to use the Village Fund to spur the village 
economy based on its local economic potential. Perhaps aware of this, the Ministry of 
Village then prioritized the development of 40 rural economic areas, spread in 60 
districts, among others in the Provinces of Aceh, Banten and Central Sulawesi. 
Regions are determined based on the availability of natural resources and the 
commitment of the local government (Kompas, 11/11/2018). 
 
The positive impact of the use of Village Funds for the development of village 
infrastructure, and the possible development of BUMDes-based village economic 
institutions, make the government claim that the level of rural poverty descrease. 
Citing BPS, as many as 60.91 percent of Indonesia's poor population live in villages, 
and 49.9 percent of them work in the agricultural sector. The BPS also noted that the 
Gini ratio of the rural population had decreased from 0.334 in 2015 to 0.320 in 2017. 
However, there were still many doubts about the claims about the signifacance of 
poverty reduction and inequality in rural areas. First, inequality due to structural 
poverty in the form of permanent subsistence life patterns, isolation, and external 
dependence is still quite widely seen in a number of underdeveloped villages, despite 
the diminishing national proportions. Second, thousands of villagers living in Riau 
Islands Province, Bangka-Belitung, North and Southeast Sulawesi, East Nusa 
Tenggara, West Nusa Tenggara, Maluku and North Maluku, Papua and West Papua, 
as well as several other provinces with high poverty rates require policy affirmations , 
so as not to continue to be dogged by the problem of purchasing power and difficulty 
accessing basic needs (Kompas, 08/10/2018). 
 
2. Discussion 
 
Basically the Village Fund policy is a real potential power to build a village so 
that it can become a national economic foundation that involves local economic 
resources. The problem is, in the operational aspect, the Government seems to only 
work alone, and does not utilize other parties who also have the power of resources as 
partners. Even if we understand one of the concepts of development based on 
partnership, the Government can actually be greatly helped to do village development 
better and more effectively. 
 
So far, the Government tends to only use human resources in the bureaucracy; 
even though private parties and universities have abundant resources. Giving trust to 
the village community to manage the Village Fund itself is actually praiseworthy, but 
perhaps it is not effective to develop rural economic potentials that require enablers 
who are able to create and think out the box. In the context of empowering all 
available resources, the partnership concept may be offered. 
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2.1. Partnership concept 
 
Conceptually, the partnership term is the cooperation of two equal parties and 
its presence is complementary. But operationally it can mean work relationships in the 
form of coordination and collaboration (see for example Balloch and Taylor, 2002: 6). 
The partnership concept in its praxis can be aimed at working on large projects, such 
as highways, railroads, procurement of electricity, telecommunications, seaports and 
airports - which the Government cannot usually do (and financed) it self. When the 
financing of an infrastructure project turns out to involve a private consortium, it 
needs to be considered carefully, whether to choose a cooperative model in the form 
of a concession or better in the form of a BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer). The BOT 
model is not the only option, because there are other options, for example: BOT 
(Build-Operate-Transfer), or BOO (Build-Own-Operate) or even DBFO (Design-
Build-Finance-Operate). All models of cooperation have advantages and 
disadvantages. Therefore, the policy makers are then required to consider the factors 
of profit and loss and the opportunity to manage risk from the chosen collaboration 
model: is the project possible to be implemented (possible), is it affordable 
(affordable), is it necessary, will it be acceptable, is it useful, whether worthwhile, and 
so on. That is what became known as the Public-Private Partnership model (see 
Budina, Brixi, Irwin, 2007). 
 
Every country seems to have different rational reasons for adopting the PPP 
model (see Table 1). But for Indonesia, like it or not, one of the dominant factors is to 
utilize the resources (especially in the financing and technological aspects) owned by 
the private sector when the government is unable to do it on its own independently. 
For example for hold a toll road construction project. The after the New Order regime 
collapse it turns out that the Indonesian Government does not have enough funds to 
provide the infrastructure needed to support economic growth. Another fact is that the 
existing infrastructure is not a few who suffer damage and need repairs. Therefore, 
perhaps an applicative model of PPP is needed, "Indonesia version" and with its own 
operational terms. 
 
The PPP concept is a term in English, what is the term in Indonesian? PPP can 
be translated as Public and Private Partnership - and perhaps it will be more honest if 
the intention is "Government and Private Collaboration" (KPS). Collaboration is 
indeed a phrase that can have a negative connotation when the intention is directed at 
an evil conspiracy; but in fact the term can be neutral in order to show the existence of 
cooperation between parties where the position of the parties cooperating is not equal.  
 
Table 1. Variations in Reasons for Choosing PPP 
No Country Reasons to do-PPP 
1 United States To improve operational efficiency 
2 United Kingdom To increase competition 
3 South Korea To access new and proven technologies 
4 India To create employment opportunities 
5 Thailand To provide services not currently provided 
6 Philippines To create transparent procurement 
7 South Africa Mobilize additional invesment funds 
Source: quoted from Parente (2006), in Sarman (2009: 23) 
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I intend to offer the term "collaboration" for the definition of partnership. The 
reason is that the collaboration between the Government and Private parties in the 
case in Indonesia is almost never equal (Sarman, 2009: 19). Sometimes the 
Government has more power; and at other times the private sector is more dominant. 
"Equality" degree of cooperation is rare between Government and Private parties 
because of various reasons and factors. One common phenomenon related to 
infrastructure development, especially in the case of infrastructure development in the 
Region. In that case the position of the Regional Government is too dominant and the 
private sector (contracting company) is often just an extension of the bureaucracy. 
Whereas in the case of national-scale infrastructure development projects and 
involving large private companies, precisely the role of the Government sometimes 
resembles mere security guards and must be shielded when confronting the reproach 
of the project repellent group. 
 
In terms of the use of the term "collaboration", its relevance is more to the 
functional aspect, that the parties that are collaborating do not have to be equal 
because what is important is the achievement of goals maximally and the results are 
beneficial to all parties, in accordance with the contribution of their respective roles. 
That there is one party that tends to behave "exploitatively" does not need to be a 
problem as long as the rules of the game are clear. The point is: substantially no party 
involved in the collaboration may be harmed. 
But in a theoretical reference, which is presented by various references, the concept 
of 
 
PPP or KPS is a matter of collaboration between the Government and the Private 
sector. The community is not mentioned in the collaboration at all. In fact, who is the 
user of the infrastructure built if not the community? 
 
In its history, the role of the Government was indeed very dominant during the 
New Order era, as if only the Government was the only institution that had the 
competence to design, facilitate, and carry out all development projects, including 
infrastructure projects. With such a paradigm, even if there is a "private" institution 
that must be involved, the private institution in question must be under the umbrella 
of BUMN (State-Owned Enterprises) or Regional-Owned Enterprises (Regional-
Owned Enterprises), so that in the end a state monopoly arises. 
 
The change in the paradigm of KPS projects took place after the New Order 
when the Government made to a number of new rules that accommodate the role of 
the Private sector as a "partner" for the Government to build the country. The idea of 
KPS is clearly a new breakthrough because it increases the role and bargaining 
position of the private sector. However, referring to the practice of the PPP model in 
Indonesia so far, it seems that a mindset change is still needed to involve the 
participation of the community or community in the process of its activities. 
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Figure 1. Government + Private + Community Collaboration Model 
 
In other words, the concept of KPS should not be enough to be limited to the 
level of government relations and private, but also to be broader to reach the level of 
community involvement. In the case of Indonesia, the factor of community 
participation is assumed to be very important in supporting development, not least in 
infrastructure development projects. Procedurally, the idea may come from the 
Government (in the form of political will) and the idea is captured by the Private 
sector as an economic project opportunity; but when the project is operating, the 
community that is involved as the operator should be involved. Even if such a model 
is not fully applicable, at least the initial idea could have originated from the 
aspirations conveyed by the Community to the Government, and the Government 
handed over its technical problems to the Private Sector on the basis that the project 
was solely built to support the welfare of the community. Thus, the pattern of 
collaboration between parties will actually be more useful if it is a collaboration 
between the Government-Private-Community (Figure 1). 
 
In my view, if the community is involved from the stage of development 
planning, then the concept will be relevant to the mindset that citizens should not only 
be used as objects of development. Citizens must be the subject of development. Only 
with such an ideology will they feel "involved" and feel "responsible" for maintaining 
development output. 
 
Community-based development is clearly a new breakthrough considering the 
typical development policies of Indonesia during the New Order period are too 
centralistic and top down oriented, in addition to tend to position citizens only as 
passive spectators. But how to formulate that strategy? The facts on the ground until 
now still illustrate that the "bottom-up" pattern as an anti-thesis of the "top down" 
pattern proved to be less effective - not least in the case of Village Fund use. Villagers 
generally interpret the means of utilizing the Village Fund from the perspective of the 
real "needs" that they feel now, not based on comprehensive planning to solve 
problems that may arise in the future. Examples such as using the Village Fund to 
build a village head's office, which is actually not too urgent compared to, for 
example, building access roads outside the village that had not been there so the 
village was isolated (see Yoseph, 2018). 
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2.2. Forms of partnership application model that can be offered 
 
In practice, the concept of PPP (or KPS) can be aimed at any field. Let's take 
the case in Japan (Sarman, 2009). In Japan, the concept of PPP is more focused on the 
issue of PFI (Private Finance Initiative). This is motivated by reasons in the context of 
the role of the private sector that can help the Government overcome the lack of 
ability of the country's institutions to provide public services related to ‘Life Cycle 
Cost’, such as school buildings, hospitals, waste management, government offices, 
etc. (see for example Takao, 2007; also Akintoye, 2003). Therefore, the basic concept 
of PFI is a financing scheme for the provision of public facilities in order to support 
the improvement of public services. However, it should be understood that the 
position of the Private Company here is not just the executor of the project (through 
the SPC/Special Purpose Company mechanism), but can also be in the capacity as a 
lender (through a consortium company) which is an equity investor. In other words, 
the stakeholders involved in an infrastructure development project for public facilities 
are not limited to project implementers, but also funders, project consultants, 
supervisory committees, and even local residents (see Figure 2). 
 
Therefore, in understanding the application of the PFI model, further 
understanding of the selection process is needed for the most preferred project 
bidders. In this context, the parties that play an important role are PFI Screening 
Committee — or if in Indonesia, perhaps the Procurement Committee — related to 
the feasibility assessment of the parties who want to take the opportunity to 
implement the project and what contract system is offered or will be agreed. The 
agreement that also needs to be set from the beginning is matters relating to risk 
allocation, whether to involve the insurance and how the agreement needs to be made 
with the funders. For the Lender, the agreement needed includes but not limited to: 
(1) establishment of security by Lender; (2) the statement of the political importance 
and the priority project; 
(3) confirmation of the fulfillment of PFI project contract; and (4) mutual reporting 
and meeting for the continuity of the project. 
(4)  
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(7) Figure 2. PFI-Based Parties' Collaboration Model. 
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In other words, there needs to be a guarantee that the infrastructure projects 
undertaken are safe from risks, including risks from default cases. That is why, in the 
PFI mechanism the role of the PFI Project Committee is also needed. The committee 
membership can be sourced from the public (residents), from the relevant government 
agencies, or representatives of the companies involved in the project, and even from 
third parties that are independent (such as a group of experts, public figures suspected 
of having relevant experience, and or a professional group like lawyers. Usually each 
party was represented by two people, and their task is: (1) To deal fairly and smoothly 
with possible arguments between Public Sector and PFI Project Company (SPC) 
during the execution of the project; (2) Judgment of service monitoring the outcome 
and contract termination; and (3) Assessment of the quality of assets transferred to the 
Public Sector at the end of the contract, etc. With this basis, the project can be 
monitored and how the mechanism for financing payments. The purpose of the 
monitoring was carried out so that the project implemented was guaranteed its 
sustainability and the guarantee to continue to maintain infrastructure when it was 
operated. 
 
With such a detailed and the clear collaboration pattern like that, it does not 
mean that every company that has the competence to be involved as a project 
implementer can easily get the project. According to the rules of the PFI law in force 
in Japan, there are further criteria relating to the benchmarks of proposals from 
private companies that should be considered to be accepted. Every private company 
that wants to be involved is required to pay attention to the assessment aspects used 
by the Screening Committee, namely: 
 
(1) The Administrator of Public Facilities, shall positively take appropriate 
measures necessary such as organizing acceptance, evaluation, notice and 
public announcement of proposals initiated by private enterprises; 
 
(2) When a judgment was made to be appropriate to implement a proposal 
initiated by private enterprise, the same procedures as the PFI undertaking 
initiated by the Administrator of Public Facilities, shall have to be conducted 
for establishment of the Implementation Policy; 
 
(3) For proposal of undertaking initiated and proposed by private enterprise, if it 
happens that the establishment of the Implementation Policy could not be 
realized within a considerable period of time, the results of such judgment and 
its reasoning shall have to be notified as soon as possible to the party proposed 
such undertaking. Further, an outline of such proposed undertaking, a 
summary of results of judgment by the Administrator of Public Facilities etc. 
and its reasoning shall have to be opened to public in an appropriate way at 
appropriate timing. 
 
According to Shinohara (1998), the emergence of the idea of a PFI-based 
development financing model is inseparable from the impact of public administration 
reform in the provision of social infrastructure and public services that occur in Japan. 
Initially, public administration reform tended to adopt what was practiced in the 
United Kingdom; but because the socio-political conditions were not exactly the 
same, there were several policy modifications. 
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According to Yajima and Araki,1 there was indeed a misunderstanding 
regarding the concepts and applications of the PFI model in Japan. These 
misunderstandings, among others, relate to the issue that when PFI is taken as a 
policy, government funds do not need to be used; and private companies involved in 
the PFI project will not fall bankrupt; while small businesses (SMEs) cannot possibly 
participate in it. In fact, PFI is actually not suitable to be applied with conventional 
business approaches because the philosophy embodied in the PFI model is how to get 
support to provide better public services because of the active role of the private 
sector. Short-term benefits are not the objectives to be achieved in the PFI model. The 
reason is, one of the things that is less profitable in the PFI model is the costs that 
must be incurred for a number of agreements with the parties. For a number of people 
who are part of the parties, the adoption of the PFI model may still be a trial and error. 
 
There are 5 things that need to be understood as "facts" if you want to apply 
PFI, namely: 
 
(1) Provision of public services and low quality; in the sense that public 
services have been so low in quality that they require new breakthroughs 
(by involving competent private parties) to obtain improved quality of 
public services and at the same time reduce unnecessary operating costs. 
 
 
 
1 Yuuichiro  Yajima  and  Takayuki  Araki  are  Project  Management  consultants  at  
Pacific 
 
(2) Consultants Co., Ltd (PCKK). Their opinion in this article is an excerpt 
from their presentation at the ID-PPP TOT training program at Miyazaki 
University, entitled "Basic Points and Facts of Japan PFI". The role of 
administrative reform in public services; in the sense that traditionally there 
are a number of activities that should be private sector work but are carried 
out by the government; and that (in the future) must be reformed in 
accordance with the duties of each function, although its nature continues 
to prioritize the importance of the cooperation of the parties. 
 
(3) Stimulating the economy through creating opportunities for private 
business; in the sense that the involvement of the private sector will 
improve the quality of public services (which are the responsibility of the 
Government) and at the same time reduce unnecessary operating costs. 
 
(4) Reduced speed of building construction; in the sense that the construction 
sector be processed by the private sector often experience the risk of delays 
from the schedule that has been designed, but by involving them in the 
planning of the expected schedule it will reduce the risk. 
 
(5) Smoothing of fiscal spending in local government finances improve; in the 
sense that the cost of research designs to repair and maintain public 
facilities is quite expensive and often unpredictable; and therefore in order 
to reduce the costs that must be borne by the government, the risk should be 
transferred to the private sector. 
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Therefore, it is necessary to understand the fundamental function of PFI, 
namely how to manage the cost of building a support facility Life Cycle Cost that the 
based on the principles of Administrative Reform, namely: 
 
(1) From  “Construction  of  Public  Facilities”  to  “Provision  of  Public  Services” 
(Meanings of Public Works): 
 
a) From specification orders to performance specification orders (Define the 
contents of public services by required standard); 
 
b) From construction works to integrated business system including design, 
construction, maintenance and operation; 
 
c) From construction cost competition to comprehensive evaluation system 
(Total score of cost and performance). 
(2) Lifecycle Cost Management: 
 
a) Improvement of efficient and effective infrastructure and provision of 
good and low-cost public services to people (Cost reduction); 
b) Promotion of efficiency by performance specification orders (Cost reduction); 
 
c) Integrated business system including design, construction, maintenance 
and operation (Cost reduction); 
 
d) Promotion of efficiency by prolonged single-year contracts to long term 
contracts (Reduction of direct cost and indirect cost); 
 
e) Promotion of efficiency by integrating maintenance (Operation 
management) (Reduction of labor costs); 
f) Risk transference (Cost reduction) 
g) Utilization of private insurance (Cost reduction); 
h) Energy management (Cost reduction). 
 
(3) Effective use of Administrative Assets: 
 
Local public authorities may lend administrative assets to selected businesses, 
if recognized necessary, disregarding the regulation local government laws. 
(PFI Law, the eleventh article, Lending out of administrative assets). 
 
In the Indonesian context, practices like in Japan may still be many obstacles. Like it or 
not, in Indonesia the behavior of the private sector tends to still show itself as a 
"contractor" from government projects that are still dominant. In addition, the general 
public also still cannot appear as subjects with an interest in development, and therefore 
are not involved actively for participating since the project planning stage.  
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2.3. The context of empowerment and revitalizing the role of the community 
 
Within the framework of the partnership concept, it is relevant to talk about 
village community empowerment programs? The answer is, why not? The weakness 
of the use of the Village Fund so far is because it focuses on infrastructure 
development, and it does not touch the issue of empowerment. Policymakers in the 
Central Government may see a backwardness in the village (read: poverty) because 
the village tends to be isolated. That may be true. But when discussion be focused on 
the efforts to prosper the people in rural areas, inevitably the problem of empowering 
rural communities should be prioritized. 
 
Referring to the research of Sarman et al (2008), community empowerment 
programs can be directed at utilizing local economic resources. Each sub-district area, 
at least, certainly has local economic resources that can be relied upon to become 
superior product. Some one tend optimistic that even if each village is unearthed its 
potential, undoubtedly has economic advantages, so the term "one village one 
product" (OVOP) applies - like the case of superior product development in Oita 
Prefecture, Japan. However, I am one of those people who are not very optimistic 
about the opportunity from one village only, and therefore interpreting it further 
becomes "one district one product" (ODOP) - like the case of superior product 
development in Uttar Pradesh, India. In fact, not every village in Indonesia has 
superior resources with high economic value. Conversely, several villages maybe at 
as having the same resources to be sold outside the region as superior product with 
competing product prices and quality, such as Medan's citrus-producing villages, or 
Papua coffee, and so on. 
 
As a comparison, once again it's good to see success stories in Japan. In general, 
projects providing PFI-based public facilities may be somewhat sterile from 
community intervention. This assumption is probably not wrong if the problem is 
seen from the infrastructure planning process and how the financing is needed to 
make it happen. 
 
However, there are three things why community members, and specifically 
certain communities, are very important in supporting the existence of a public 
infrastructure development project. First, the function of infrastructure is sometimes 
very dependent on community participation, such as infrastructure related to the 
municipal waste management system. Second, public facilities need care, and in this 
case certain community groups can contribute, such as city park infrastructure. Third, 
increasing the economic value of an infrastructure development project will 
sometimes be more significant when a particular community is involved in its 
management operations. 
 
In Miyazaki, Japan, several infrastructure development projects can be found 
facilitated by the PFI model but it is even more valuable when local communities are 
involved in the operation of their use. One example of a community-based PFI model 
is the "Nichinan Coast Kirameki-line" project. The project was designed with the 
intention of developing tourist areas in the Nichinan region which are famous for its 
coastal potential. The goal is to be able to invite as many tourists and tourists to be 
satisfied with a number of attractions given by local residents. Therefore, the strategy 
was then designed to create a beautiful, friendly and healthy tourist area, there are 
historical links and myths. 
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This pattern of cooperation developed in the "Nichinan Coast Kirameki-line" 
project involves three main actors, namely: academics (in this case Miyazaki 
University) who are tasked with designing the landscape of a tourist area; industry 
circles, covering 41 private organizations; and the Government, both central and 
regional governments. The parties were then designed to collaborate with the local 
resident (see Figure 3). 
 
The collaboration of the parties is designed in such a way as to complement 
each other. The Government, in accordance with its capacity and authority, is asked to 
provide a role in the construction of road facilities. Meanwhile, the volunteers called 
"Michimori", gave a touch of beauty to the environment around the road built by the 
government. In a pattern of cooperation called "Joint flower planting projects among 
communities", local residents voluntarily work together to plant cooperatives along 
the roadside to tourist areas with diverse flower plants, even to the center of tourist 
sites; and they have done it from 2005 to 2008. As a complement to community 
activities, they also take care of the forest around the tourist sites to support a design 
called "SEAGAIA". 
 
 
Academia Industry Government 
 
 
 
 
Local 
Residents  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Partnership for Nichinan Coast Kirameki-line.  
(Source: Tanigoshi, 2009). 
 
"SEAGAIA's Planning" is a program design for tourists who are directed to visit 
a number of unique tourism objects, such as "Udoyama Excursion" (with the main 
object of sea catch, shrimp), "Aburatsu Port and Hori River Story" (with the main 
object, exploring river), and "Tour of Obi Castle Town" (with the main object riding 
on rickshaw (traditional pedicabs that are haunted by humans) around the tourist 
sites), or visiting the location of pine forests which sometimes become an introduction 
to the natural environment of students and students. Tourists are also allowed to visit 
historic attractions, such as Jurakudai palace and a samurai school (Shintoku Clan 
School). Even by the local government, there is a unique tourist location in the form 
of "Dream Bridge" (Yumehashi) in the center of Nichinan, a wooden bridge with very 
beautiful architecture, which is deliberately built with mythical spells that it is a 
legendary proof of a prince's love for the daughter he loves. 
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According to my observations, what is presented by the Nichinan Regional 
Government to develop tourism objects is not extraordinary if for comparison it is a 
tourist attraction spread in Yogyakarta for example. Various tourism objects in 
Yogyakarta are perhaps far more interesting and unique. The difference is, maybe in 
terms the tourism management pattern of. In Nichinan, there are no tourist locations 
that are subject to entrance fees. There is no vehicle parking fee. Even though the cost 
of infrastructure development it should be very large. Even if there are things that like 
"business", then the they business is souvenirs and a number of restaurants that 
provide a variety of Japanese specialties with prices that are "indeed expensive" for 
Indonesian people. 
 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
Village development policy is not perfect and needs further improvement. 
Village Fund Policy, as one of the Government's strategies to carry out Indonesia's 
development from the periphery, aims to realize an independent and dignified village. 
Therefore the point is how to build humans living in the countryside. However, in 
practice, the Village Fund policy tend not support community empowerment directly. 
First, because the Village Fund, in accordance with the allocation of its allocation all 
this time, focuses more on infrastructure development. Second, after the infrastructure 
project is completed, management of human resource development is often forgotten. 
In fact, the aspect of human resource development is more decisive in increasing the 
level of welfare of villagers. 
 
The purpose of introducing a partnership model or collaboration in the use of Village 
Funds is actually intended so that these funds provide more outcomes for the 
community, so that rural communities can become independent. That the PPP or KPS 
or PFI model is not always in accordance with the conditions of the problem and the 
village environment, does not mean that the model offered in general must then be 
rejected. The partnership choice models must indeed be modified. It is the same as the 
OVOP or ODOP choice model to develop the rural economy based on existing local 
potential. Best practice from the implementation of certain models does require a pilot 
project first. However, waiting for the results of the pilot project is not an option, 
because the Government is now racing against time to get the best results from the use 
of effective and accountable Village Funds. Perhaps to find best practices in various 
regions, it is better if examples of success in various regions in using Village Funds 
for increase the role of BUMDes, are disseminated to other regions to be role models. 
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